the Problem of Moral Responsibility

[Leonard]

(Since English is not my everyday-life language and since I usually only use a rather casual English daily, I'm afraid I might not be able to answer as elaborate and proper as I would like to. But nevertheless, I'll give it a try.)

Originally Posted by Hidden

What the oubliette does is it creates the conditions in which it is impossible for the prisoner to live. It does not actually kill him--malnutrition, disease, or perhaps even some wild animal that finds him down there does that. Rather than an out-and-out device of execution, it is a device of control--it places the prisoner in a position where he cannot act, even for self-preservation.

If you want to question the morality of this issue, I'd say it comes down to the same situation as any other murder. Only that it takes a lot longer.

The moment you set up the conditions in a way for a person that it does not allow him/her to live, you take that person's life away, thus murdering.
Theoretically, it would be the same if you shot someone. If you want to blame the wild animals, malnutrition or diseases for the act of killing in that case, you might as well blame the bullet instead or yourself, too.

In the end, what you intended as the same.

At least that's what I think.

Originally Posted by Hidden

I'd like to point out--all justifications thus far (and Q's rebuttal of the arms dealer's justification) assume that moral responsibility is limited in some way to intention. Is this necessarily the case; could someone be morally responsible for consequences of their actions that they did not intend?

To me, the intentions act as a sort of "requirement" for moral responsibility. There cannot be any without the necessary "evil" or "wrong" intentions behind them with the case you're dealing with.

Maybe I can take these examples to elaborate:

Originally Posted by Hidden

All posters have stated that responsibility does lie on the person who sets up these conditions, but I'm not sure we've taken the question to its full extent. The greatest rates of crime occur under the conditions of poverty; horrible acts may be sanctified in the condition of war; the world itself imposes its all-too-imperfect conditions upon each of us, under which we must find some way to act and to live, and we have very different ways of doing that. The question is, to what extent are the conditions -or rather the persons or gods that set up those conditions- morally responsible for the actions and consequences that occur, such as those that occur within the oubliette?

In this case, the moral responsibilities would lie with all the "persons or gods that set up those conditions" as you called them, if their intentions were going in such a negative directions and knew they would such conditions upon us.

However, I don't think we can deem those people morally responsible for the actions or consequences that may occur taking advantage of it, simply because that wasn't what they aimed for or what they purposely set up at the time.

Originally Posted by Hidden

If a family member got sick with the old trash in the house, would the child be morally responsible for that?

Originally Posted by Bleeding Soul

Acutally, it does befall the child because of the fact that he/she did not take out the trash. Regardless of whether or not the collectors came and got it as scheduled, the sick family member would be at cause of the effect.

Responsible, yes.
Morally responsible however, I don't think so.

You can think of this scenario, too: Let's say, when you asked the kid afterwards if he would've brought out the trash if he had known beforehand that it would harm it's family, would you still be able to call him "morally responsible"? Would that extra-thought of his make up for it?

Originally Posted by Hidden

intention--action--consequence

Now, recall (one of) the original question(s) of this thread--what distance is there between an action and a consequence at which we are still morally culpable?

...

...what need is there to consider why I took the action of either shooting or selling the gun or eating lunch?

I do not really think there is any need.

Think of this situation:
On one hand you have a scenario where the knife salesman sold a knife to a man, who immediately thereafter killed a person with that knife.
Then on the other hand, you have a "parallel" scenario where the knife salesman sold a knife to a man, who did not immediately thereafter kill a person with that knife.

In both scenarios, the knife salesman goes through the exact same actions with the exact same intentions in his mind.
Naturally, you wouldn't say that the knife salesman did anything wrong in the second example, either morally or in any way else. So why would you would you do so in the first one, although the actions of the salesman were the exact same?


I hope I could make my point clear with this, since it's quite late at the moment here in Germany (and I'm pretty tired), and I can't guarantee that it all makes sense. I'll try to join this discussion a little longer and see if I can expand further on this in my next posts, if I think of anything I forgot to include in this one.

[Nevermore]

Originally Posted by Hidden

So the Nuremberg trials were a sham, at least in those cases where they sentenced the high-ranking officials who rarely took direct action.

I suppose. I feel that punishment should always be given to the person who committed the crime. If said high-ranking officials committed no crime, then there's no need to be punished as a criminal.

[Hidden]

Leonard: I'm glad you chose this example in particular, because it seems to me the most pressing and the most difficult.

Originally Posted by Leonard

If you want to question the morality of this issue, I'd say it comes down to the same situation as any other murder. Only that it takes a lot longer.

Then why do you think they did it this way? What was the purpose of the oubliette versus direct devices of execution?

Originally Posted by Leonard

The moment you set up the conditions in a way for a person that it does not allow him/her to live, you take that person's life away

I cut off the end of this response; you finish with "thus murdering," but I think you phrase it better with "you take that person's life away." That's what this problem is really about, not just murder (which we still think of as a one-to-one, direct cause-and-effect action), but what conditions a person may be put into that can be said to "take that person's life away"; conditions such that he or she cannot live by their own will. To continue...

Originally Posted by Leonard

In this case, the moral responsibilities would lie with all the "persons or gods that set up those conditions" as you called them,

But this is where either everyone or noone goes to hell. Who set up the conditions of poverty and war; who do we blame for the very conditions of human life? God? Ourselves? It could go either way, or both. As Ragione asks, "That's to wonder, what are we besides products of directly uncontrollable factors?"

And what does this mean for the people in these conditions?

Originally Posted by Leonard

if their intentions were going in such a negative directions and knew they would such conditions upon us.

This is where I'm not sure intention is relevant at all--the conditions are generated and exist, whether intended or not. What difference does it make what the war's intention was? The conditions of the war are going to be largely the same.

Originally Posted by Raven

I suppose. I feel that punishment should always be given to the person who committed the crime. If said high-ranking officials committed no crime, then there's no need to be punished as a criminal.

You take a position opposite of Leonard then; one says responsibility lies on those who create the conditions, the other says responsibility lies on those who act within those conditions. I do think you're right, to a degree: actions taken, within any condition, confer some degree of responsibility.

Originally Posted by Leonard

To me, the intentions act as a sort of "requirement" for moral responsibility. There cannot be any without the necessary "evil" or "wrong" intentions behind them with the case you're dealing with.

There is no good or evil without intention.

For purposes of length and focus, I've cut out a lot of Leonard's response; what I really wanted to address is given above, but I can attempt to return to these other points later perhaps.

[Leonard]

Originally Posted by Hidden

Then why do you think they did it this way? What was the purpose of the oubliette versus direct devices of execution?

As a sort of a cover up, I guess. To make them look less "heartless".

Originally Posted by Hidden

But this is where either everyone or noone goes to hell. Who set up the conditions of poverty and war; who do we blame for the very conditions of human life? God? Ourselves? It could go either way, or both. As Ragione asks, "That's to wonder, what are we besides products of directly uncontrollable factors?"

I guess one could endlessly debate this issue without getting any real answer to it.

Originally Posted by Hidden

There is no good or evil without intention.

I'm afraid I don't quite understand what you're trying to say with that.

"To me, the intentions act as a sort of "requirement" for moral responsibility. There cannot be any without the necessary "evil" or "wrong" intentions behind them with the case you're dealing with."

Was it supposed to be a counter-argument to this or something else?

Originally Posted by Hidden

This is where I'm not sure intention is relevant at all--the conditions are generated and exist, whether intended or not. What difference does it make what the war's intention was? The conditions of the war are going to be largely the same.

The conditions would remain the same, yes. But the moral responsibility of the people involved in the process wouldn't, depending on the intentions they had beforehand.
If it is relevant or not, that depends on what exactly you wanted to hear about; the conditions and who set them up, or who's morally responsible for them.

Or, maybe I'm just too stupid to get your point. :|

Originally Posted by Hidden

I'd like to point out--all justifications thus far (and Q's rebuttal of the arms dealer's justification) assume that moral responsibility is limited in some way to intention. Is this necessarily the case; could someone be morally responsible for consequences of their actions that they did not intend?

You said this in the thread earlier.

I guess the point I'm trying to make could be pretty much summed up with this question. My answer would be no, I don't think moral responsibility can be given for something not intended.

On a side note, I asked you a question about a specific scenario in my last post that hadn't been answered yet. Maybe it's not relevant to the purpose of the thread, but I would be very interested to hear your opinions on it nonetheless. Maybe it can help illustrate my point a little better, too.

Think of this situation:
On one hand you have a scenario where the knife salesman sold a knife to a man, who immediately thereafter killed a person with that knife.
Then on the other hand, you have a "parallel" scenario where the knife salesman sold a knife to a man, who did not immediately thereafter kill a person with that knife.

In both scenarios, the knife salesman goes through the exact same actions with the exact same intentions in his mind.
Naturally, you wouldn't say that the knife salesman did anything wrong in the second example, either morally or in any way else. So why would you would you do so in the first one, although the actions of the salesman were the exact same?

[Nevermore]

Originally Posted by Hidden

You take a position opposite of Leonard then; one says responsibility lies on those who create the conditions, the other says responsibility lies on those who act within those conditions. I do think you're right, to a degree: actions taken, within any condition, confer some degree of responsibility.

I think that the problem with putting the blame on the person making the conditions, is that those who act within it did so of their own volition. Now, if it was designed so that it was the ONLY possible option available, then I might cast blame on the maker of the conditions, but not for the same crime as the others. They would be held accountable to a different crime that they actually committed themselves.

On a side note, I would tend to disagree on the "no good or evil without intention" point. While it is certainly unfortunate, all actions occur regardless of intention. For example, if you accidentally shoot and kill someone, they are still killed and you would still be held for murder. It should also be pointed out that in situations where the "intention" argument takes effect, it is either due to a lapse in judgment (randomly using a gun in the first place) or a result of misdirected intention (you meant to shoot someone else). That doesn't change whether the action is good or bad, just the circumstances that the action occurred in.

[Alaude Drenxta]

Originally Posted by Hidden

"For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail."
How far does the horseshoe maker's moral responsibility extend?

If an entire battle is lost because of one rider, it was a lost battle any way.
The maker is responsible for arming the horse, and he failed to do so.
His failure may have caused a butterfly effect, but his failure was to the horse and by ownership laws, responsible for guilt to the horse's owner.

[Hidden]

Originally Posted by Leonard

As a sort of a cover up, I guess. To make them look less "heartless".

Perhaps. Or perhaps there is a difference between killing someone and forgetting to maintain their life, at least psychologically.

Originally Posted by Leonard

I guess one could endlessly debate this issue without getting any real answer to it.

It is a problem. Until we definitively find whoever set up the conditions of poverty that generate so much crime; the conditions of war that validate killing; and the conditions of life that (perhaps) determine all human action, we can't effectively move forward with this reasoning.

I agree with your (and many others') reading of the oubliette--it is a case where we can assign direct and simple responsibility for conditions that bring about a person's death. Same with your example of a man shooting a gun. But these are all very limited cases. It is the larger conditions like those above that kill millions and that we don't know what to do with. This is why the oubliette is such a difficult problem--on an individual level, we think we can answer it morally, and perhaps we can; on a larger scale, such as we so often find in life, it overwhelms us.

Originally Posted by Leonard

I'm afraid I don't quite understand what you're trying to say with that.

"To me, the intentions act as a sort of "requirement" for moral responsibility. There cannot be any without the necessary "evil" or "wrong" intentions behind them with the case you're dealing with."

Was it supposed to be a counter-argument to this or something else?

I was just thinking aloud, if one can do that in written form. I'll address it further in response to a later post.

Originally Posted by Leonard

The conditions would remain the same, yes. But the moral responsibility of the people involved in the process wouldn't, depending on the intentions they had beforehand. [...]

I guess the point I'm trying to make could be pretty much summed up with this question. My answer would be no, I don't think moral responsibility can be given for something not intended.

It's a very compelling but problematic argument. Is the intention of the oubliette to kill a human being (reprehensible) or to remove a dangerous and disruptive figure from society (laudable)? Or is there even intention involved in "forgetting" someone?

There are also so many systems in place that allow us to buy into and profit from conditions that "take others' lives away" without intending anything but our own profit. Today we can be aware of hurting others without intending to; what do we do in these conditions?

Originally Posted by Leonard

Or, maybe I'm just too stupid to get your point. :|

Hardly--you've engaged the question completely and intelligently.

Originally Posted by Leonard

On one hand you have a scenario where the knife salesman sold a knife to a man, who immediately thereafter killed a person with that knife.
Then on the other hand, you have a "parallel" scenario where the knife salesman sold a knife to a man, who did not immediately thereafter kill a person with that knife.

If the knife salesman is acquitted for the second case, he is acquitted for the first. If he is guilty in the second, he is guilty in the first. The problem is not in timing, but in distinguishing between the knife salesman and the arms dealer, as has been debated in the thread without conclusion.

Originally Posted by Raven

I think that the problem with putting the blame on the person making the conditions, is that those who act within it did so of their own volition. Now, if it was designed so that it was the ONLY possible option available, then I might cast blame on the maker of the conditions, but not for the same crime as the others. They would be held accountable to a different crime that they actually committed themselves.

Here is the other side of the coin, at least as important. How do we act morally within conditions not of our choosing? What do we actually mean when we speak of conditions that "take peoples' lives away;" are the human beings within them truly without agency or responsibility?

With the oubliette, it's a simplified case--we don't really blame the person in the oubliette for "choosing" to die. But is every soldier morally responsible for every murder they commit in the course of war? Does action taken at gunpoint have the same moral significance as action taken otherwise?

Originally Posted by Raven

On a side note, I would tend to disagree on the "no good or evil without intention" point. While it is certainly unfortunate, all actions occur regardless of intention. For example, if you accidentally shoot and kill someone, they are still killed and you would still be held for murder. It should also be pointed out that in situations where the "intention" argument takes effect, it is either due to a lapse in judgment (randomly using a gun in the first place) or a result of misdirected intention (you meant to shoot someone else). That doesn't change whether the action is good or bad, just the circumstances that the action occurred in.

Mechanical determination. And should the conditions be discarded?

This is a bit of a departure, but there's an interesting thought to take from Orwell's 1984. Toward the end, O'Brien explains to Winston the progression of control over individuals. In the middle ages, control was exercised only over actions, and people could still yell their heresies to the world*; in the totalitarian soviet union, control was exercised over actions and words, so that people had to agree with the power over them but still could harbor their own intentions in secret; in the world of 1984, the party controls intention directly, and in doing so controls the human being entirely.

I find this a very compelling image on the importance of intention; intention as the very substance of what a human being is, the final key to their identity. And if we identify moral responsibility as a trait unique to humanity (as thus far we have), how can we separate the two?

(*also, Orwell underestimates the middle ages--christian doctrine also answered the need to control intention. "You have heard that it was said 'Do not commit adultery.' But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart" (Matthew 5:27-28))

Originally Posted by Alaude Drenxta

If an entire battle is lost because of one rider, it was a lost battle any way.
The maker is responsible for arming the horse, and he failed to do so.
His failure may have caused a butterfly effect, but his failure was to the horse and by ownership laws, responsible for guilt to the horse's owner.

Ah, so the six degrees of separation does have an end, and we can retain our sanity and our innocence. So long as we know--what made the maker responsible to the specific task of shoeing the horse?

[Nevermore]

Originally Posted by Hidden

Here is the other side of the coin, at least as important. How do we act morally within conditions not of our choosing? What do we actually mean when we speak of conditions that "take peoples' lives away;" are the human beings within them truly without agency or responsibility?

With the oubliette, it's a simplified case--we don't really blame the person in the oubliette for "choosing" to die. But is every soldier morally responsible for every murder they commit in the course of war? Does action taken at gunpoint have the same moral significance as action taken otherwise?

Well, I wouldn't classify all "killing" to be classified as wrong. Murder is more specific. That would be the predetermined killing of another with malicious intent (it's also been called the shedding of innocent blood). While murder obviously occurs in war, every act of killing (inside of war, or outside) isn't murder. The "taking of life" isn't wrong, murder is wrong.

Originally Posted by Hidden

Mechanical determination. And should the conditions be discarded?

But I digress, I would still hold the person accountable for their actions (at the very least, they would have to bear the burden of having committed the act, regardless of circumstances). While it is true that we need circumstances to make moral decisions, morality is to be the standard(s) by which we act in them. Take the moral standard that murder is wrong, for example. We can't make that decision unless we are in a situation that demands the choice be made; but when the scenario arrives, that moral standard is to be the decision that should be made.

Originally Posted by Hidden

This is a bit of a departure, but there's an interesting thought to take from Orwell's 1984. Toward the end, O'Brien explains to Winston the progression of control over individuals. In the middle ages, control was exercised only over actions, and people could still yell their heresies to the world*; in the totalitarian soviet union, control was exercised over actions and words, so that people had to agree with the power over them but still could harbor their own intentions in secret; in the world of 1984, the party controls intention directly, and in doing so controls the human being entirely.

I find this a very compelling image on the importance of intention; intention as the very substance of what a human being is, the final key to their identity. And if we identify moral responsibility as a trait unique to humanity (as thus far we have), how can we separate the two?

(*also, Orwell underestimates the middle ages--christian doctrine also answered the need to control intention. "You have heard that it was said 'Do not commit adultery.' But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart" (Matthew 5:27-28))

I don't deny the intrinsic value of intention, merely the thought that it's morality is neutral without it. While I suppose that it could be true if you bar intention completely; at the least, that would be mute, because there is always intention behind an action. I personally don't feel that intention should be used as a "cop out" for those that want to ignore or "bypass" the actions that they've committed.

[Alaude Drenxta]

Ah, so the six degrees of separation does have an end, and we can retain our sanity and our innocence. So long as we know--what made the maker responsible to the specific task of shoeing the horse?

He defined his own level of involvement, thus limiting his responsibility for the outcome. A sword is much less responsible for a lost battle than a warrior, just as a warrior is less responsible for the loss than a general, and a general to a king.